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Abstract In this article, we articulate and defend a contextual approach to political
theory. According to what we shall call ‘iterative contextualism’, context has two
important roles to play in determining what is required by justice. First, it is through
the exploration and evaluation of multiple contexts that general principles are
devised, revised and refined. Second, significant weight should be given to the
norms to be found in specific contexts because the people affected by those norms
strongly identify with them. Having said this, the application of general principles to
particular contexts may still result in recommendations which deviate to some
degree from the prevailing norms. In this case, we shall argue that although justice
requires something other than what local norms say, what is required is likely to be
intimated by the relevant context. Thus, whilst considerations of identification act as
significant constraints on iterative contextualists’ thinking, the idea of intimations
provides them with an important resource.
Keywords Context  Hate speech  Norms  Oakeshott  Principles
Introduction
When considering what justice requires in a particular situation, political theorists
may feel two impulses. One is to draw back from that situation, in order to search
for universally valid and objectively grounded knowledge of justice which can be
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applied to each and every situation in which relevantly similar issues of fairness are
at stake. The other impulse is to get closer to the particular situation with which they
are concerned, in an attempt to determine what is required of justice by immersing
themselves in the specific details of this local context. Thus for every Plato seeking
knowledge of an eternal and unchanging idea of justice, there is an Aristotle
developing a detailed typology of existing political systems in order to understand
how best to fashion constitutions for peoples with different characteristics and
resources. In our own time, we may say that for every Cohen (2008) seeking to
articulate principles of justice wholly independent of any facts about the world as
we know it, there is a Walzer (1983) arguing that what justice requires is highly
dependent on the meaning of the social goods available to be distributed in each
particular political community.
In this article, we articulate and defend a way of doing political theory which is
much closer in spirit to Aristotle and Walzer than to Plato and Cohen. However,
given that there is a wide range of contextualist political theories, we need to show
where our version is located in this range, and more importantly we need to
demonstrate what is distinctive about it. One way in which we can begin to do this is
by reference to Sune Lægaard’s recent analysis of different forms of contextualism
in contemporary political theory. For our current purposes, three of these forms are
of particular importance. First, for methodological contextualism, context ‘is
relevant… in the formulation and critical testing and modification of the theory’
(2015, p. 6). Here Lægaard is thinking of John Rawls’s method of reflective
equilibrium. Second, there is applicatory contextualism, according to which
‘context co-determines what implications general principles have for particular
cases or kinds of cases’ (2015, p. 10). Third, for theoretical contextualism
‘context… determines the scope, function and normative standards… of political
theory’ (2015, p. 13). On this version of contextualism, in other words, the
interpretation of a context is a way not just of formulating principles but also of
justifying them as ‘appropriate for this specific context’ (2015, p. 16). What we shall
call iterative contextualism shares elements with each of these three forms. First, it
endorses a variant of reflective equilibrium, although we refer more often to Joseph
Carens’s notion of reflective disequilibrium. Second, our position also resembles
that of applicatory contextualism insofar as we argue that it is the interaction of
contextual facts and cross-contextual principles which generates specific conclu-
sions about the requirements of justice. We deny, however, that it does so in the way
that Lægaard describes. Third, we agree with theoretical contextualism that the
interpretation of context is vital to the justification of principles. But we reject
Lægaard’s claim that to endorse this view is to assume that principles can simply be
read off from contexts.
Having put our conception of contextualism into some context, we can now
outline the distinctive features of our position. Our key claim is that context has two
important roles to play in determining what is required by justice. First, it is through
the exploration and evaluation of multiple contexts that general principles are
devised, revised and refined. Second, significant weight should be given to the
norms to be found in specific contexts because the people affected by those norms
strongly identify with them. Of course, all political theorists who regard themselves
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as contextualists will agree that context has a crucial role to play in determining
what justice requires. In this case, we shall need to show that our version of this
claim is distinctive and at least worthy of serious consideration. One distinguishing
feature of our argument will be the claim that, although what is just will depend to a
significant degree on the nature of the local context, the application of general
principles to particular contexts may still result in recommendations which deviate
to some degree from the prevailing norms. In this case, we shall argue that, although
justice requires something other than what local norms say, what is required is likely
to be intimated by the relevant context. Thus, whilst considerations of identification
act as significant constraints on iterative contextualists’ thinking, the idea of
intimations provides them with an important resource. We shall draw on Michael
Oakeshott’s notion of the ‘pursuit of intimations’ in order to explicate this part of
our argument (1951).
In the next section, after sketching three contemporary contextualists’ concep-
tions of context, we draw on these in order to outline our own conception. In the
section that follows, we explain why we argue that theorists should formulate and
finesse their principles by seeing how they apply in a variety of such contexts. In the
section after that, we explain why our sort of contextualist may be critical of aspects
of a particular context in the name of principles which, whilst arising out of the
encounter with a number of contexts, are not wholly reducible to any of them. In the
final section, we draw the various threads of our argument together, emphasizing the
close relationship between general principles and particular contexts. We illustrate
our argument throughout by reference to the problems and challenges presented by
the multicultural character of contemporary states, focusing in particular on laws
criminalizing the incitement of hatred against groups defined by race, ethnicity and
religion. We do so partly because this is an area with which we are familiar, but also
because we hope to contribute to a lively ongoing debate about methodology in
political theory which focuses specifically on multiculturalism (e.g. Carens
2000, 2004; Bader and Saharso 2004; Parekh 2005; Levy 2007; Lægaard
2008, 2009, 2015; Modood 2009; Modood and Thompson 2015).
Characterizing Contexts
We begin this section by presenting three different, but by no means unrelated,
accounts of context to be found in the work of three well-known contemporary
exponents of a contextualist method. Bearing Lægaard’s analysis in mind, we
believe these to be a representative sample from the full range of contextualist
political theories. We then present our own conception of context as a network of
norms which is associated with particular practices and institutions.
Walzer’s Semantic Contextualism
It is probably true to say that Walzer’s Spheres of justice (1983) remains the best-
known contemporary example of a contextualist theory of justice. In Lægaard’s
terms, it may be regarded as a strong form of theoretical contextualism. By calling
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this version of contextualism ‘semantic’, our aim is to draw attention to the importance
of meanings in his account. According to Walzer, in order to understand what
distributive justice requires, it is necessary to understand the meanings of the ‘social
goods’ which are to be distributed. The first thing to note about these goods is that there
is always a multiplicity of them which may be distributed justly or unjustly (1983,
p. 3). Furthermore, Walzer emphasizes that there is no single correct procedure for
distributing these goods, no single agent in charge of distribution, and no single
criterion by which such distribution could be ordered (1983, pp. 3–4). Social goods
should, rather, be distributed by different procedures, by different agents and for
different reasons (1983, p. 6). Thus Walzer asserts: ‘All distributions are just or unjust
relative to the social meanings of the goods at stake’ (1983, pp. 8–9).
On the basis of this theory of social goods, Walzer gets to an account of a just
society as one in which the distribution of each social good is autonomous: ‘Every
social good or set of goods constitutes, as it were, a distributive sphere within which
only certain criteria and arrangements are appropriate’ (1983, p. 10). If each good
remains in its own sphere, so that possession of one cannot lead to possession of
others, then we have a ‘complex egalitarian society’ (1983, p. 17). It is important to
note, however, that Walzer does not regard this as an ideal society towards which all
actually existing societies ought to tend. Rather, since what is just is relative to
social meanings, it is possible that, where dominant social meanings take a different
form, even highly inegalitarian societies—such as the Indian caste system—can be
just: ‘In a society where the social meanings are integrated and hierarchical, justice
will come to the aid of inequality’ (1983, p. 313). Later on we shall make brief
reference to the way in which Walzer moved away from this strong relativist
position not long after the publication of Spheres of justice.
Carens’s Institutional Contextualism
Carens’s political theory may be understood as a combination of what Lægaard calls
methodological and applicatory contextualism. Rather than focus on the meanings
of social goods, Carens conceives of context in terms of concrete practices and
institutions. As he says, ‘a contextual approach to political theory encourages us to
begin thinking about citizenship by reflecting upon existing practices’ (2000,
p. 176). His reason for looking at existing practices and institutions is that ‘forms of
wisdom’ may be ‘embedded’ in them (2000, p. 13; and see 2004, p. 121). He is
aware of—and unembarrassed by—the genealogy of such a notion: ‘The idea that
established institutions and practices may contain forms of wisdom that theories fail
to capture is a Burkean insight, of course, but I do not see why it should be restricted
to conservatives’ (2004, p. 122).
Having said this, it must be emphasized that Carens’s position does not amount to
a naive and uncritical endorsement of all existing institutions. He acknowledges that
the characteristic danger of contextualism is that it may fail to recognize existing
injustices (2000, p. 4). This, for Carens, is not a reason to abandon his approach:
In the version I am advocating, a contextual approach to theory does not entail
granting normative priority to the way we do things now. It simply imposes an
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obligation to reflect upon the way we do things and what that may teach us.
Practice is not given a privileged position in relation to theory. It is simply
given standing. (2004, p. 122)
This is, however, a standing that must be challenged: it is necessary, as Carens puts
it, for a contextual approach to move back and forth between principles and
practices—following what he calls a method of ‘reflective disequilibrium’ (2000,
p. 5; and see 2004, p. 122). We shall present our own version of this method below.
Miller’s Relational Contextualism
What we are calling Miller’s ‘relational contextualism’ is probably best regarded as
a form of Lægaard’s applicatory contextualism in which context and principle are
co-determined. In contrast to both Walzer and Carens, Miller’s focus is strongly on
the relationships between the people to be found in a particular context. His basic
claim is this: ‘If we want to understand what social justice means—justice among
the citizens of a large modern society—we need to examine the many different ways
in which they associate with each other’ (2013, pp. 5–6; and see p. 7). Relationships
are of fundamental importance since they explain who owes what to whom and
why. Furthermore, since there are different kinds of relationship, the specific kind
operating in a particular situation must be identified in order to understand what
justice requires there. As Miller says, on his version of contextualism, context is
defined ‘by reference to the kind of social relationship that exists among the parties
between whom justice is to be done; the principle that should be used to determine
whether an allocation of resources in each of these contexts is just will depend on
which kind of relationship obtains’ (2013, p. 48).
Miller’s fundamental idea, that context is to be characterized in terms of
relationships from which the requirements of justice can be inferred, is worked out
in detail in his Principles of social justice. There he identifies three ‘basic modes’ of
human relationship which he calls ‘solidaristic community, instrumental association,
and citizenship’ (1999, pp. 25–26). In each of these types of relationship, a distinctive
principle of justice should prevail: a criterion of need applies in the case of solidaristic
community, one of desert in instrumental associations and one of equality in the case of
citizenship (1999, pp. 26–30). Having said this, it is important to understand that, for
Miller, an account of justice which is sensitive to context is not one that simply
endorses the conventions which prevail in any particular situation. Rather, he argues
that justice is achieved when the conventions governing a context are appropriate to it.
The crucial implication is that, when those conventions are not appropriate, they may
be legitimately criticized (2013, pp. 49–50).
Normative Practices
In order to introduce our own conception of context, a couple of observations about
the three conceptions that we have just sketched are in order. The first is that, at least
for the purposes of our current argument, these conceptions may be regarded as
offering different perspectives on the same object. In order to see this point,
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consider how deeply interrelated goods, institutions and relationships are; it is
difficult, we would suggest, to imagine a situation in which one is present without
the others being there too. For example, institutions and relationships are linked
since most sorts of relationship are only possible if certain institutions exist. Miller
makes this point himself, acknowledging that what we are calling his relational
account ‘ignores the fact that people who are related in one or more of these three
basic ways will usually also have an institutional relationship, defined by the law or
by other rules and procedures’ (1999, p. 26). In a similar way, all of the social goods
on which Walzer focuses are exchanged in relationships and/or distributed through
institutions. Membership, for instance, takes the form of relationships between
citizens, and depends for its existence on the institutions of the state (Walzer 1983,
chapter 2).
Building on this observation that the three forms of contextualism on which we
have focused describe the same sort of object from three different perspectives, we
want to offer a conception of contexts which describes the object underlying all of
these accounts. Hence we propose to characterize contexts as normative practices, a
phrase we use as shorthand for networks of norms strongly associated with
particular sets of practices. By use of the word normative, we intend to focus on the
norms which we understand as elements of the moral grammar of each particular
context. For our purposes, norms may be regarded as rules that shape and direct
behaviour, enabling the actions of a number of individuals to be coordinated in
pursuit of a common purpose or activity of some kind.1 But it must be understood
that we use this word norm to encompass a wide range of evaluative and action-
guiding entities, including, for example, values, ideals, rules, maxims, tenets, morals
and goods. Returning to Walzer, Carens and Miller, then, we can say that there are
norms present in goods, institutions and relationships which prescribe how these
objects should be distributed, organized or conducted. Norms, in other words, shape
our understanding of social goods, mould and flow through institutions, and
facilitate and govern our relationships with one another.
Following on from this last remark, the second observation we want to make is
that the three contextualist theories which we have discussed may at some points
give a misleading impression of the relationship between particular contexts and
general principles. On Miller’s account, for instance, it might appear that it is
possible to get from an entirely factual account of the type of relationship present in
a particular context to a normative conclusion about the sort of principle of justice
which should prevail in that context. The reason why this is misleading is that sets
of relationships are always already suffused with and regulated by norms, which are
vital to maintain the character and the continuing existence of these relationships. In
a relationship of solidaristic community, for example, individuals are attentive to
one another’s needs; if they were not, then that relationship would not exist (or at
least it would not be a relationship of that kind). The same reasoning applies, ceteris
paribus, to Walzer’s social goods and Carens’s institutions. In Walzer’s terms, part
of the meaning of a good is an account of how it should be distributed. It is arguable
1 Compare Aaron James’s definition of a social practice (2013, p. 44).
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that, in Carens’s case, part of the ‘wisdom’ that an institution may contain is to be
found in the norms which regulate it.
This second observation that norms are always intimately connected to goods,
institutions and relationships explains why we characterize a context as a normative
practice, where we use this word to refer to any more or less organized pattern of
human behaviour. For us, then, rather than being elements of free-floating networks
of ideas, norms are strongly associated with and rooted in particular goods,
institutions and relationships, and have concrete institutional locations, including
parliaments, courts, schools, political parties, social movement organizations,
businesses and so on. We would suggest that by connecting norms to practices in
this way we can avoid the error of assuming that it is possible to infer principles of
justice directly from value-free accounts of contexts. Since such contexts are
necessarily normative in character, they are not logically different in kind from the
principles which we believe should regulate them. As we shall see below, the fact
the norms are always entwined with practices also has significant implications
regarding the feasibility of normative principles.
Before considering how the iterative contextualist formulates her principles by
reference to contexts understood in the way just described, a couple of final remarks
are in order. First, the norms which animate practices range in character from highly
complex and fully articulated principles, such as widely promulgated constitutional
principles and statutory laws, to largely unspoken and informal rules of behaviour,
such as rules of civility, which may be broadly understood and followed even
though they are rarely if ever articulated. In this article, we focus on a number of
formal norms to be found in legal systems. But nothing would stop our method also
being applied to more informal codes such as that of civility, or to issues of social
justice such as fair taxation. Second, the practices containing such norms may range
considerably in size and scale, including the legal, political or educational system of
a particular state, and the culture of a specific group of people or of a particular
organization within that state. As we shall see in the next section, normative
practices also exist at regional and global levels above individual states. For
instance, the European Convention on Human Rights contains a set of legal norms
with authority over the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights seeks to provide a common standard of
human rights for ‘all peoples and all nations’. Third, as we shall see in the section
after next, norms always require interpretation, and they may always be interpreted
in different ways. Furthermore, more than one norm may be found in any particular
practice, and these may come into conflict with each other, making it inevitable that
choices must be made between them.
Formulating Principles
We now shift our attention to the way in which an iterative contextualist formulates
the principle or set of principles of justice which she regards as appropriate to
evaluate the sort of contexts that we have just described. We shall show how this
theorist initially generates her principles, and how she then refines and revises them
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as she sees how they apply across a number of different contexts. In order to do this,
we shall focus on one particular political issue, namely that of hate speech, and
consider how the iterative contextualist might develop principles capable of
determining the appropriate way to deal with expressions of this kind.
Before we begin, a word of caution is needed. Our account will be somewhat
abstract, in one specific sense. At various points, we suggest that our theorist may
decide to modify her principle in some way, so that it incorporates a new norm or
encompasses a different range of groups. But we do not explain in detailwhy she might
decide to do so. We shall, in other words, abstract from the first-order argument about
what hate speech regulation should be like in order to focus on the second-order
argument about methodology. Such abstraction is justified, we believe, because it
enables us to focus on the part of this process which is of particular concern to us,
namely the relationship between the theorist’s general principles and the norms to be
found in the particular contexts in which she wishes to apply those principles.
Generating Principles
With that caution in mind, let us consider how the iterative contextualist initially
formulates her principle or principles of justice. She begins by examining one
specific context which is characterized in part by a particular set of norms. As a
result of this examination, she formulates a principle which she regards as
appropriate for the evaluation of that context. She then uses this principle to make a
judgement about what justice requires there. This way of putting it might appear to
suggest that, since she has no other normative resources on which to draw, this
theorist will inevitably come up with a principle which bears a very close
resemblance to the norms characterizing the context with which she is concerned. In
practice, of course, political theorists will always already have a fund of normative
principles at their disposal, one or more of which they may regard as relevant to the
evaluation of a particular context.
Let us illustrate this account of how the contextualist first generates her principles
by reference to the example of hate speech. The first context that she encounters is
that part of the legal system in England and Wales which is concerned with hate
speech in the period between 2001 and 2006. The theorist’s aim is to decide whether
the scope of the existing legislation should be extended in order to cover not only
racial hatred but also hatred on the grounds of religious belief. In order to be able to
do this, she must first determine which norm or norms are most relevant to decide
the issue, and this in turn requires her to determine which of them makes best sense
of this legislation and shows it to be of greatest value.2 Looking at existing laws on
hate speech, and other cognate pieces of legislation, the contextualist determines
that it is a norm of equality, where this is understood to require equal protection of
an appropriate kind, which best fits the bill.3 In light of this interpretation, the
2 We shall say more about the need always to interpret and sometimes to choose between norms when
discussing the idea of the pursuit of intimations later on.
3 In support of this interpretation, see, for example, David Nash’s and Chara Bakalis’s analysis of the
Racial and Religious Hatred Act (2007).
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theorist decides that the principle appropriate to determine whether the existing
legislation should be extended is also one founded on the value of equality. Finally,
by applying this egalitarian principle, she concludes that the scope of hate speech
legislation should indeed be broadened so that it includes groups defined by their
religious beliefs or their lack of such beliefs, since they need the same sort of
protection as that enjoyed by the groups already identified by the existing laws.
Refining Principles
On our account thus far, the political theorist has examined just one particular
context. The point of calling our sort of contextualism iterative, however, is to
emphasize that the theorist’s principles are generated, refined and revised in the
process of applying them across a range of different contexts, in the encounter with
a number of different sets of norms. Consider, then, how this sort of contextualist
applies her principle to a new context with its own set of norms. In this process, she
may conclude that her existing principle may be applied in an unchanged form to
both since it is as relevant and valid in the second context as it was in the first. It
seems rather more likely, however, that the examination of this new context will
give her reason to refine her principle to at least some degree. In this case, it is this
modified principle which she will then use to decide what justice requires in this
new context.4
We can illustrate this part of the process by staying with the same example of
hate speech, but now considering a second context. Let us focus once more on the
legal system of a particular state. In France, the key legislation in this area is the
Law of the Freedom of the Press of 1881, amended on several occasions since it was
first promulgated, but still in force today. Again the theorist’s task is to determine
which sorts of group should be protected by this legislation, and again, in order to be
able to do this, she first needs to decide which norm or norms play the most
important part in the justification of this legislation. In this context, she makes
particular note of Articles 32 and 33 of the 1881 Law which criminalize defamatory
communication about a range of groups. Having thus examined the French Law and
its various amendments, our contextualist concludes that protection against
defamation—the harm to a person’s reputation which may be caused by the
expression of falsehoods about them—is one of the most important norms animating
the French legislation.
Understanding the importance of this norm in the context of the French legal
system may then give the contextualist reason to refine her original principle.
Having considered this new context, the theorist now believes that the idea of
reputational damage provides an important insight into the nature of the harm which
4 Clearly there is more to be said about the details of the process by which the iterative contextualist
compares her existing principles to the norms to be found in each new context she considers. In the field
of political theory, for instance, there is a growing literature on the comparison of political concepts (e.g.
Freeden and Vincent 2012). In a similar vein, legal and constitutional scholars have been refining
accounts of how to systematically compare constitutions (e.g. Ginsburg and Dixon 2011; Hirschl 2014).
Both of these approaches contain resources on which we would wish to draw if we had the space for a
complete exposition of this part of our position.
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hate speech may do, against which equal protection needs to be provided.5 Thus she
fleshes out her original principle by incorporating this insight into it. Having done
so, applying her revised principle leads her to conclude that it should also offer
protection to groups defined by their sexual orientation6 (and, if the theorist returned
to the first context, she may now believe that hate speech legislation in England and
Wales should also be extended in this way). This process of refinement may be
repeated on further occasions. On each occasion, the examination of a new context
may give the theorist reason to finesse her principle yet further, adding new details
to it in light of the insights newly gained.
Revising Principles
In describing the process by which the theorist refines her principle, we have
assumed up to this point that its essence remains the same, but that a series of further
nuances are added to it, just as—to be a little fanciful—an oyster adds further layers
of nacre to a pearl. However, as she examines a new context, the contextualist may
have good reason not just to fine-tune her principle in some way but also to revise it
to some significant degree, perhaps by removing some of its particular components
and replacing them with others. Furthermore, as a result of such a revision to her
principle, the theorist’s evaluation of a particular context may also change, which
may then give her reason to revise her principle once more. Nor is this necessarily a
once-and-for-all change, since the theorist’s new evaluation of a context may then
give her reason to modify her principle yet again.
Here we see in effect a version of a process of reflective equilibrium much like
that Rawls describes in his Theory of justice (1971), although for us the process we
have described has one significant difference. For Rawls, reflective equilibrium is an
oscillating movement between a theorist’s particular moral judgements and her
general principles.7 For us, by contrast, this back-and-forth movement is between
our evaluation of a set of norms to be found in a particular context and the principles
which we believe apply to that context. On our account, in other words, one half of
the circular process of reflective equilibrium describes the way in which general
principles may be revised as a result of the encounter with plural sets of norms,
whilst the other half of the circle describes the process by which the modified
principles are then used to pass revised judgement on those sets of norms. In theory,
this process of mutual adjustment may continue without end, as further rounds of
revised evaluations and revised principles are possible, in a variation of the process
which, as we have seen, Carens calls reflective disequilibrium.
In order to introduce this part of our account, we shall return once more to the
example of hate speech regulation. It may be recalled that at the end of the previous
section we said that relevant contexts may exist at various levels, including the
5 On the idea that a notion of ‘group defamation’ may provide an important justification for hate speech
regulation, see Waldron (2012).
6 See McCaffrey (2005, pp. 208–209).
7 This is what Rawls later calls narrow—in contrast to wide—reflective equilibrium; see Daniels (2011)
on the difference between the two.
T. Modood, S. Thompson
123
local, national, regional and even global. In the case of hate speech, one clearly
relevant context is the legal regime shaped by the European Convention of Human
Rights and presided over by the European Court of Human Rights. Thus, having
looked at the laws of two particular states, our contextualist now turns her attention
to the European context in which hate speech legislation is formulated and enforced.
She observes that one of the ways in which the Court seeks to determine whether a
particular expressive act should be regulated is to consider whether it constitutes an
abuse of the right to freedom of expression because it negates the Convention’s
fundamental values. For example, in the case of Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (2007), the
Court decided that the applicant’s anti-Semitic newspaper articles were not
protected speech since such ‘a general and vehement attack on one ethnic group is
in contradiction with the Convention’s underlying values, notably tolerance, social
peace and non-discrimination’ (European Court Of Human Rights 2007). Let us say
that, as a result of her examination of this new context, our contextualist decides to
revise her principle, believing that another legitimate objective of hate speech
legislation is to protect these values. Let us also say that, after reflecting on this new
context, the theorist also comes to the view that it makes no sense to say that groups
can be defamed, and thus she abandons that particular element of her principle. Both
of these changes may also give her reason to change the scope of her principle,
including groups previously left out, or excluding groups previously protected.
In drawing this part of our argument to a close, let us emphasize one point in
particular. According to what we are calling iterative contextualism, the theorist
generates, refines and revises her principles through the examination of a series of
particular contexts. As a result of this process, she may legitimately conclude that a
principle is applicable to all of these contexts. This does not imply, however, that at
some point this principle can float free of all particular contexts, and thenceforth
apply with equal validity to any context at all. On our position, rather, the theorist
can only say with confidence that a cross-contextual principle is applicable across
that specific range of contexts which she has examined and in which she has
concluded that it is germane. This does not mean that all principles must necessarily
have a narrow range of application. Perhaps a hate speech regulation which
explicitly prohibits racist chanting at football matches is necessary in Scotland, but
nowhere else. Perhaps a regulation which prohibits Holocaust denial is required in a
number of European states, including Austria, Germany and Romania, but not in all.
Perhaps one part of the rationale for hate speech regulation, such as an idea of
human dignity, will turn out to apply to all actual contexts. To underline our main
point, however, this is not because it is valid independent of any context, but rather
because it turns out that it is relevant to all.
Applying Principles
Thus far we have explained why the iterative contextualist regards contexts as
networks of normative practices, and how she formulates her principles by
considering how they pertain to a number of such contexts. Now we need to show in
more detail how she applies these principles in a particular context. We shall begin
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by showing that, on our position, what is suggested by a principle of justice will
very often deviate to at least some degree from existing norms. Then we shall
explain why we nevertheless do not give absolute priority to the demands of justice
since we give significant weight to those norms. Finally, if and when the dictates of
local norms and the demands of justice come apart, we show how it may be possible
to balance these two sets of considerations in a coherent and principled way.
Criticizing Norms
One frequently voiced criticism of contextualist political theories is that they can do
no more than endorse existing political arrangements, no matter how just or unjust
these may be (according to some external standard of justice). Against this view, all
three of the contextualists we considered above explain why, on their accounts, it is
possible to criticize such arrangements. Walzer’s account of internal and external
criticism (1987), Carens’s idea of reflective disequilibrium (2004, p. 122) and
Miller’s distinction between contextualism and conventionalism (2013, pp. 49–50)
all provide justifications for taking a critical perspective on existing sets of norms.
Like these three, our sort of contextualist also seeks to achieve critical distance from
the norms which characterize the contexts with which she is concerned. We now
want to explain how it is possible for her principle of justice to provide a standard
by which local norms can be criticized.
The best way to do this is to return to the case of hate speech. In our account of
how the contextualist generates her principles of justice, we saw how she considers
a series of contexts, and how, in each place, she discovers distinctive justifications
for hate speech laws, and distinctive accounts of the range of groups which should
be protected by them. As the theorist moves from one context to the next, her
principles are refined and revised in the ways we have described. Sometimes further
reasons are incorporated into her account of the rationale for legislation against hate
speech, whilst at other times reasons which she had included are now abandoned. As
we suggested earlier on, the contextualist may ditch the idea of group defamation,
but add the idea that hate speech regulation protects social peace. At the same time,
her account of the appropriate scope of such laws changes, as she sometimes adds a
new group, but occasionally drops another. For the sake of argument, let us say that
she adds members of the travelling community,8 but for some reason now excludes
those defined by their lack of religious belief.
Given the nature of this iterative process, it should be clear why, on our account,
what justice requires in each particular context is never a simple and direct function
of the norms to be found there. Although principles are generated by a process of
reflection on context, because this process is iterated across a number of such
contexts, the principle which emerges will be at variance with the set of norms
which characterize any one of them. For instance, whilst it applies to the French
legal system, it does not accept the idea that hate speech laws are justified because
they protect groups against defamation. It also applies to England and Wales, but
does not endorse that jurisdiction’s assumption that the scope of hate speech laws
8 See, for example, Ireland’s Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989.
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should extend to those who lack religious beliefs. In this way, the iterative
contextualist’s general principle provides a standard of judgement which is to some
degree critical of the normative practices to be found in any one of the contexts from
which it was forged.
Valuing Norms
However, it does not follow from what we have just said that, whenever the iterative
contextualist’s principle of justice is out of line with existing norms, the former
takes absolute priority over the latter, so that the people in that context are obliged
to bring their normative practices into line with the demands of justice. This is
because she believes that there are a number of important considerations which must
be borne in mind when seeking to reach an all-things-considered judgement about
what should be done in each particular situation. To be more specific, she accepts
that there are several sorts of constraint—practical, behavioural and normative—
which she must place on her reasoning in order to apply her principle of justice in
such a way that it is tailored (to some degree) to the character of each context.9
First, then, there are practical constraints which concern the feasibility of
different courses of action. The practices, structures and institutions which
characterize a particular context at a particular time render a number of options
entirely unfeasible, and make some options much less feasible and much more
difficult to implement than others. Such limits and constraints need to be taken into
account if the theorist is to avoid insisting on changes to existing normative
practices which have no chance whatsoever of being implemented. Having said this,
it seems reasonable to hope that this will be less of a problem for iterative
contextualism than for some other approaches to political theory. The fact that this
theorist’s principles emerge from her exploration of a number of specific contexts
means that there is unlikely to be too large a gap between her principles and norms
to be found in those contexts. To put it more positively, there is a good chance that
this theorist’s conclusions about what should be done in a particular situation will be
feasible, in Gilabert’s and Lawford-Smith’s sense of ‘a state of affairs’ which ‘one
we could actually bring about’ (2012, p. 809). There is much more that can and
should be said about the significance of the hitherto relatively neglected issue of
feasibility, but for reasons of space we cannot do so here.10
Second, when applying her general principle in a particular situation, the iterative
contextualist is also cognizant of certain behavioural constraints which concern how
we can reasonably expect people to behave, and in particular about the extent to
which we may reasonably expect them to change the way they behave. In the spirit
of the practical sort of constraint just mentioned, it is no good insisting that justice
requires conformity to some particular pattern of behaviour if there is no chance of
the people concerned actually behaving in that way. But it is important to emphasize
9 Our account of these three constraints resembles to some extent a number of the constraints and
prerequisites which Carens identifies as elements of what he calls a ‘realistic’ approach to morality
(1996).
10 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012) provide an excellent introduction to this concept.
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that we do not see people’s likely behaviour simply as an obstacle which can get in
the way of the achievement of justice. On our account, rather, independent
normative weight is given to the fact that people’s sense of who they are, what
larger community they are part of, and what they believe and value, are all shaped in
part by the norms embodied in the practices, structures and institutions which form
the context of their lives. Given such identification, changes to existing norms, and
thus to the institutions and practices with which they are associated, come at a price
to the individuals affected by them. Such changes are likely to have profoundly
disruptive effects on them, since they are forced to detach themselves from norms
which had hitherto given them a significant part of their sense of identity. For us, it
follows that, when seeking to determine what the requirements of justice in a
particular situation are, the contextualist must pay attention to the identity-related
costs which would have to be borne by those individuals whose lives would be
affected by any changes which the implementation of those requirements would
involve. This should not be the contextualist’s sole consideration, and certainly not
one that should outweigh all others, but it is one to which she should give significant
weight.
The third and final sort of constraint which the iterative contextualist imposes on
her thinking about justice is normative in character. To accept such a constraint is to
give particular consideration to the ideals and values that the people in a particular
context presently endorse. These norms are not a practical obstacle to a theorist’s
desired ideal—like a limited housing stock—but are ideals in their own right, and
the theorist could only achieve her independent goal if people did not value what
they in fact do value, if they thought differently. To see why this sort of constraint
should be adopted, consider Aaron James’s defence of what he calls ‘the practice-
based method of justification’ of principles of social justice (2013, p. 43). He
suggests that political theory is an activity which may have a variety of legitimate
purposes, and that the purpose chosen will determine the manner in which it is
pursued. For example, ‘our theoretical aims’ may be ‘purely intellectual in the
following sense: we seek to justify requirements of justice for a stipulated set of
social circumstances that are, for some good reason, of interest to us’ (2013, p. 48).
In this case, the way in which we think about justice will not necessarily—but
may—be entirely insensitive to current practices. If, however, ‘our aim is… to
justify principles as normative for us’, then ‘we have a natural rationale for
beginning from the social practices we already have… our argument then has a firm
normative footing, a footing from which to mount moral arguments about what the
demands of justice are’ (2013, p. 56). Following James’s analysis, we understand
iterative contextualism to be a political theory of the second kind. We aim, in our
case, to understand what justice requires people to do in particular contexts, and
therefore the character of the norms which characterize each context will play an
important role in our thinking, not just as facts but as constituting the normative
context.
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Pursuing Intimations
Thus far we have argued that the iterative contextualist can criticize existing
normative practices in the name of her cross-contextual principles, whilst at the
same time we have suggested that there are good reasons why she should give
special weight to those existing practices in her reasoning. Thus this theorist
determines what justice requires in a particular situation by applying her principles
to it in a way which is responsive to its specific circumstances. There is, no doubt, a
certain tension between these two aspects of our account: valuing existing norms, on
the one hand, and criticizing them in the name of principles, on the other. Although
this tension cannot—and should not—be resolved, we nevertheless want to end this
section by suggesting that, in at least some situations, it may be possible to ease it to
some degree.
Our inspiration here is Oakeshott’s account of the practice which he calls ‘the
pursuit of intimations’. We believe that three aspects of his account can be
incorporated into our iterative contextualism. First, Oakeshott contends that political
activity necessarily takes place within ‘recognized traditions of behaviour’ (1962,
p. 123). Such traditions are, at least for the purposes of the current argument,
sufficiently similar to our conception of contexts as complex networks of normative
practices. Second, these traditions have several important characteristics: they are
‘neither fixed nor finished’, they have ‘no changeless centre’, and no part of them is
‘immune from change’ (1962, p. 128). Third, given these first two aspects of
Oakeshott’s account, he regards politics as the activity of pursuing and making
choices between the intimations or sympathies that we find in these traditions:
‘political reasoning’, he suggests, involves ‘the convincing exposure of a sympathy,
present but not yet followed up, and the convincing demonstration that now is the
appropriate moment for recognizing it’ (1962, p. 124).
Oakeshott’s idea of ‘the pursuit of intimations’ suggests that we need to add
further complexities to our account of the way in which the iterative contextualist
assesses each of the particular contexts with which she is concerned. Thus far we
have assumed that there is only one norm germane to each particular context, and
that this norm can only bear one interpretation. In practice, however, matters are
rarely as straightforward as this: there will generally be more than one norm present
in each context, and each of them may be interpreted in different ways. It follows
that when the theorist examines a particular context she will face two interrelated
tasks: first, to determine which norm is of most importance to it, and, second, to
decide how that particular norm should be interpreted. To carry out these tasks, she
will need a theory of interpretation. Here, we would suggest, the two criteria at the
heart of Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive method provide the right guidance.
According to the first criterion, the norm selected must be one element of a
plausible account of the context in question. Second, as Dworkin says, of those
interpretations which fit the context, the theorist must select the one ‘which is
‘‘substantively’’ better, that is, which better promotes the political ideals he thinks
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correct’ (1982, p. 171).11 Our suggestion is that these further complexities present
the iterative contextualist with an opportunity: namely, to offer an account of what
justice requires in a particular situation which narrows—even if it does not entirely
close—the gap between the existing norms and her principle of justice. To put this
in Oakeshott’s terms, the contextualist can pursue those intimations which tend in
the direction of the principle which she has developed through her consideration of
contexts elsewhere.
In order to explain how this might work in practice, we shall return for a final
time to our ongoing example. It may be recalled that in the case of hate speech laws
in England and Wales, our contextualist determined that the key norm is that of
equality. In fact, it is arguable that norms of public order and anti-discrimination are
also present in this body of law (Twomey 1994). Furthermore, the norm of equality
itself could be understood in terms say of equal dignity or status rather than equal
protection. Why, then, pick out the norm of equality? And why interpret it in terms
of equal protection? We have suggested, following Dworkin, that the right
interpretation is the one which fits the existing practice and also shows it to be of
greater value than other interpretations would. In this particular case, we would
suggest that it is a reading of these hate speech laws in terms of the norm of equal
protection which best fits this bill: there is good reason to think that this norm is an
important part of the rationale for these laws, and understanding them in its terms
shows them in the best light. Our claim, then, is that this method of interpretation
can help to ease the tension between valuing and criticizing norms which we
described at the start of this section, by enabling the iterative contextualist to give a
reading of the context with which she is concerned in a way that best harmonizes
with her existing principle of justice.
Conclusion
In this article, we have introduced and outlined the principal features of what we are
calling an iterative conception of contextualism. In order to make the distinctiveness
of our conception clear, we have focused our attention on two of its most important
features. The first of these is its account of how principles in political theory are
generated, refined and revised by considering the sets of normative practices to be
found in a number of different contexts. Each context gives a principle a distinctive
inflection, and a number of these inflections together constitute the particular
character of that principle. In making this claim, our aim has been to avoid what we
regard as a false choice, according to which normative principles are either
formulated without regard to any context, or are regarded as direct reflections of
each particular context. By suggesting that principles are developed and refined
through the encounter with multiple contexts, this choice may be evaded.
The second feature of iterative contextualism on which we have focused is its
account of how principles are to be applied in each particular situation. Here we
11 Compare the second and third stages of James’s process of justification, which he refers to as
‘characterization’ and ‘substantive argument’ respectively (2013, pp. 45, 55–58).
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began by insisting that what is required by justice may not be exactly what a
particular set of norms says. But we also suggested that, when seeking to determine
what is required, the contextualist must bear a number of considerations in mind. To
be specific, we argued that she will place certain practical, behavioural and
normative constraints on her process of reasoning, thus taking into account matters
of feasibility, reasonable expectations about how people may behave and the moral
significance of existing norms. We ended with the suggestion that the tension
between valuing existing norms but also criticizing them in the name of a principle
of justice can be eased by showing how it is possible to follow the intimations to be
found in a particular context in the direction of the theorist’s general principles. For
us, this account of the practice of political theory shows how it may be possible to
avoid a second false choice, this time between giving absolute priority either to
extant local norms or to context-independent general principles in deciding what is
required by justice.
With these two features in mind, we can see clearly how iterative contextualism
shares elements with several of Lægaard’s types of contextualism, but understands
and combines them in a very distinctive way. Like methodological contextualism, it
endorses a form of reflective equilibrium, but in this case the equilibrium it seeks is
one between contextual norms and cross-contextual principles. Similar to applica-
tory contextualism, it suggests that contexts and principles co-determine the
requirements of justice. On our account, however, pre-existing principles are not
simply refracted through particular contexts, since these principles only emerge out
of the exploration of multiple contexts. Iterative contextualism also bears some
resemblance to what Lægaard calls theoretical contextualism, since it supports the
view that principles of justice are formulated and justified by a process of contextual
interpretation. But this does not commit us to the view that such principles are no
more than the reflection of contexts; rather, since principles emerge from a number
of contexts, they can be critical of the norms prevailing in any one of them.
Of course, we cannot pretend to have presented a fully adequate defence of our
version of contextualism here. Amongst other things, such a defence would need to
offer a detailed account of the ways in which it is better than other versions of
contextualism, some of which we mentioned earlier on. And it would need to build
on the example provided in this article in order to show in much more depth how
this form of political theory would work in practice. Amongst other things, this
would include giving a more detailed account of the way in which contexts are
interpreted, and how different contexts are compared to one another. This having
been said, we would contend that presenting the principal features of iterative
contextualism all in one go has been a worthwhile exercise. We think that this is a
distinctive and coherent account of how political theory should be practised, one
which is at the very least worthy of serious consideration. As we have illustrated by
using the example of hate speech regulation, we believe that it is a method which
may be fruitfully pursued by those engaging in the political theory of multicul-
turalism, but we are convinced that it is of more general applicability than that.
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